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Abstract. More and more software projects today are security-related in one way or the other. 
Requirements engineers often fail to recognise indicators for security problems which is a major source 
of security problems in practice. Identifying security-relevant requirements is labour-intensive and error-
prone. In order to facilitate the security requirements elicitation process, we present an approach 
supporting organisational learning on security requirements by establishing company-wide experience 
resources, and a socio-technical network to benefit from them. The approach is based on modelling the 
flow of requirements and related experiences. Based on those models, we enable people to exchange 
experiences about security-requirements while they write and discuss project requirements. At the same 
time, the approach enables participating stakeholders to learn while they write requirements. This can 
increase security awareness and facilitate learning on both individual and organisational levels. As a basis 
for our approach, we introduce heuristic assistant tools which support reuse of existing security-related 
experiences. In particular, they include Bayesian classifiers which issue a warning automatically when 
new requirements seem to be security-relevant. Our results indicate that this is feasible, in particular if 
the classifier is trained with domain specific data and documents from previous projects. We show how 
the ability to identify security-relevant requirements can be improved using this approach. We illustrate 
our approach by providing a step-by-step example of how we improved the security requirements 
engineering process at the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) and report on 
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Abstract More and more software projects today are se-
curity-related in one way or the other. Requirements engi-
neers often fail to recognise indicators for security problems
which is a major source of security problems in practice.
Identifying security-relevant requirements is labour-inten-
sive and error-prone. In order to facilitate the security re-
quirements elicitation process, we present an approach sup-
porting organisational learning on security requirements by
establishing company-wide experience resources, and a so-
cio-technical network to benefit from them. The approach
is based on modelling the flow of requirements and related
experiences. Based on those models, we enable people to ex-
change experiences about security-requirements while they
write and discuss project requirements. At the same time, the
approach enables participating stakeholders to learn while
they write requirements. This can increase security aware-
ness and facilitate learning on both individual and organi-
sational levels. As a basis for our approach, we introduce
heuristic assistant tools which support reuse of existing se-
curity-related experiences. In particular, they include Baye-
sian classifiers which issue a warning automatically when
new requirements seem to be security-relevant. Our results
indicate that this is feasible, in particular if the classifier is
trained with domain specific data and documents from pre-
vious projects. We show how the ability to identify security-
relevant requirements can be improved using this approach.
We illustrate our approach by providing a step-by-step ex-
ample of how we improved the security requirements engi-
neering process at the European Telecommunications Stan-
dards Institute (ETSI) and report on experiences made in this
application.
Keywords secure software engineering, requirements
analysis, organisational learning, requirements workflow
modelling
Address(es) of author(s) should be given
1 Introduction
The growing complexity and interoperability of today’s soft-
ware systems creates new security challenges. Even compo-
nents and features that are initially not considered security-
relevant may compromise security when combined with
other features. In a complex software system, requirements
and components are provided by a variety of project part-
ners. In order to close security loopholes, potential problems
should be detected as early as possible during the develop-
ment process. Requirements that may eventually affect sys-
tem security need to be checked carefully before being im-
plemented.
However, identifying those requirements is difficult:
Complex business processes, organisational needs, and crit-
ical assets are handled by software systems. Thus, specifi-
cations from different project partners are voluminous and
contain many requirements. Security requirements may be
implicit, hidden, and spread out over different documents.
Any bug or unforeseen feature interaction in the systems
can increase its vulnerability and diminish system security.
Stakeholders often miss security-related requirements be-
cause of their limited security expertise and experience in
assessing security implications.
Threats to security are a moving target: Attackers find
new security breaches - and security experts develop new
strategies to eliminate them. The body of security expertise
is not static. Knowledge and experience is growing on both
sides. Continuous learning about security requirements and
implied vulnerabilities is indispensable.
From an organisational perspective, one of the biggest
problems in security engineering is the lack of experts.
The basic idea of our research is to address this problem
by reducing the dependency on experts by applying experi-
ence-based tools (e.g. HeRA, the Heuristic Requirements
Assistant [26], see Section 4) were possible. This sets free
*Manuscript
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2resources for tasks that cannot be delegated to computer
tools. Furthermore, non-experts learn while interacting with
experience-based tools due to the feedback they receive. We
relate this idea to the existing concepts of organisational
learning.
Organisational learning in general comprises the fol-
lowing aspects (cf. [40]):
1. Competent individuals
2. Organisation-wide collection of knowledge and experi-
ence, independent of individuals
3. Cultivation of infrastructure for exchange across stake-
holders, experts and stored experience
An organisation needs to provide opportunities for learn-
ing and incentives for applying what has been learned. As
more developers acquire basic or even advanced knowledge
in security, the shortage of competent personnel can be mit-
igated. Our approach can substitute experts, at least for a
while. At the same time, it helps stakeholders to develop
their security expertise.
Organisational learning faces different challenges in dif-
ferent domains. The specific constraints and challenges de-
termine how the above aspects of organisational learning
can be instantiated in the domain of assessing the security-
relevance of requirements. As a result, processes, workflows,
and tool support are enhanced in an integrated way.
In previous papers [14,23], intermediate results of this
improvement effort were reported. The dedicated require-
ments engineering tools we developed include the HeRA
heuristic requirements assistant [26] and its extension by Ba-
yesian filters [14].
This paper focuses on the approach of improving infor-
mation flows by applying heuristic requirements tools in the
development process. We address the three aspects of or-
ganisational learning in the specific case of security require-
ments (see Table 1). We describe how our approach was
applied to the requirements elicitation process of the Euro-
pean Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) in or-
der to enhance their ability to identify security requirements
early. ETSI is a major standardization organization within
the telco domain and was responsible for the standardiza-
tion of GSM, UMTS and LTE (2G, 3G and 4G). ETSI is
member-driven; members include ISP, smart card providers,
network providers, and others and spans across Europe, Asia
and the US. One should however note that the approach is
independent of the ETSI environment. It can be applied to
other environments for taking best advantage of their respec-
tive experts, resources, and for tailoring workflows.
In order to demonstrate how the security requirements
gained in the elicitations phase can be integrated in the sys-
tem design phase, and in order to feed back previous ex-
perience from designing secure systems into the elicitation
phase, we use the security extension UMLsec [18] of the
Unified Modeling Language (UML). This extension allows
the system designer to include security requirements and
other security-relevant information within the system de-
sign models created with the UML notation. There also exist
tools which allow the designer to verify the UMLsec models
against the security requirements that are included to make
sure that the design supports the requirements [17].
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Sec-
tion 2 describes and discusses the challenges of continuous
learning in requirements engineering for security-sensitive
systems. In Section 3 we show step by step how we inte-
grated learning into the ETSI security requirements process.
Heuristic tool assistants are needed to enact that new process
and flow of experience. In Section 4 we show how those
tools can be used to substitute the presence of a security
expert in requirements elicitation. In particular, we present
how Bayesian classifiers can be integrated to improve secu-
rity awareness and provide results of an evaluation (Section
5). In Section 6 we reflect on the presented results and point
out future directions. Section 7 outlines related work. Sec-
tion 8 concludes the paper.
2 Organisational Learning on Security Requirements
Security experts are in high demand in an organisation and
have no extra time to spend on documenting their experi-
ence. Many of them struggle to keep informed of new secu-
rity developments while working full time in projects. That
makes security experts a scarce resource. Development or-
ganisations must use those experts as efficiently as possible.
Security experts will need to focus on the most critical and
demanding projects and tasks.
As a result, there are often no security experts available
to support other projects. Even specific phases during the
development of critical systems might not have a security
expert assigned. Those projects run a significant risk of over-
looking security issues in requirements. Weaknesses found
only later during implementation are much more costly to
handle. We propose to support security experts by sharing
their expertise if no human expert is available. At least part
of their experience must be stored or encoded in an appropri-
ate way and brought to bear when requirements are written
or discussed. This highlights the necessity for organisational
learning. It also points to the specific challenges organisa-
tional learning faces in security requirements elicitation and
analysis (see Table 1):
1. Individual learning is difficult under the strict time pres-
sure of a software project. How can individuals be en-
couraged and enabled to invest in learning while they
work?
2. Sharing experience and documenting it is a key chal-
lenge: Security experts are already the bottlenecks in an
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3Table 1 Overview of organisational learning in security requirements engineering. The table summarizes the specific challenges in this environ-
ment. The main characteristics of our approach are related to the aspects of organisational learning. The last row points to the concrete example
used in this paper in order to illustrate the respective aspects of our approach.
Aspect Individual learning Infrastructure for exchange Collection of expertise
Visualisation
Challenge in
Security RE
Time pressure in projects. Finding
time for learning. Motivation to
invest time.
Invisible network of
workflows&dependencies.
Organizing flow of requirements
and tacit security experience.
Experts are bottleneck. Must not be
distracted. No additional effort can
be spent for capturing or
documentation.
Approach Interactive identification of security
requirements using tool. Reuse of
experience.
Easy-to-use graphical models for
analyzing and discussing
improvements explicitly.
Reuse existing specifications.
Encode experience in heuristic rules
etc.
Instance/
Example
Stakeholder use HeRA and
Bayesian classifier like an
RE-specific spellchecker and learns
from feedback.
Step by step Scenario of designing a
tailor-made workflow.
Heuristic critiques and training data
of Bayesian classifier incoporated in
HeRA.
organisation. They cannot carry an additional burden of
experience documentation. How can their experience on
security be captured and stored without consuming even
more of their time and attention?
3. Infrastructure for exchange refers to workflow, networks
of people and tools. That infrastructure must bring the
distributed expertise and experience to bear on a given
project. How can the sophisticated flow of requirements
and security experience be organized and designed?
Much of the experience is tacit [35]. It rarely gets docu-
mented.
Individual learning is related to organisational learning
as one of its aspects by the above definition. The benefit
of individual learning (aspect 1) for the organisation is of-
ten a one-way relationship: The organisation benefits from
the individual learning effort, but there is little gratification
in return. Our approach facilitates individual learning as a
side-effect of organisational learning aspects. The key to in-
tertwining these two modes of learning lies in an interac-
tive application of heuristics during a stakeholder workshop
or direct interaction. Tools and techniques need to be de-
veloped and adapted to support that vision. We suggest to
co-evolve tools, infrastructure, and flow of requirements and
experiences. Stakeholders use the tools and witness the iden-
tification of security-related requirements which they might
either have overlooked – or not considered a security issue.
Kelloway and Barling [19] point out that each individ-
ual knowledge worker needs to have (1) the ability, (2) the
motivation, and (3) the opportunity to engage in knowledge
work. While ability is a personal property, an organisation
needs to provide motivation for learning and opportunities
for applying what has been learned. The infrastructure and
tool support we are going to present below is tailored to en-
courage learning and the application of knowledge. Mostly,
stakeholders and knowledge workers should see the imme-
diate advantage of removing security risks early.
When more developers acquire basic or even advanced
knowledge about security issues, the shortage of competent
personnel can be mitigated. Our approach can substitute ex-
perts in some cases and mitigate their absence to some ex-
tent in other cases. At the same time, it helps stakeholders to
develop their skills in security requirements engineering.
Establishing a collection of experiences and require-
ments documents addresses aspect 2 of organisational learn-
ing. Experiences on requirements and how they affect secu-
rity need to be collected and stored in a reusable format. We
address this issue by using the infrastructure of the Heuris-
tic Requirements Assistant (HeRA) [26]. HeRA allows to
encode experiences as heuristic critiques based on a script
language [27]. In addition, it is possible to capture knowl-
edge about identifying security-relevant requirements with
help Bayesian classifiers (as discussed in Section 4 and in
[23]). Both mechanisms store experiences in a reusable for-
mat, which is important for reducing the strong dependency
on experts. When experts are completely or partly replaced
by experience-based tools, they gain free time.
For addressing aspect 3 of organisational learning, our
goal is to feed back previous experience from designing se-
cure systems into the elicitation phase. To achieve this, we
make use of the security extension UMLsec [18] of the Uni-
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4Security
Requirements
Elicitation
Wishes and
Raw requirements
Organisational
Learning
Exp.
Base
Individual
Learning
Improved
Security
Requirements
apply reflect
reuse encode
encode
train
Fig. 1 Learning model, integrating individual and organisational learning.
fied Modeling Language (UML), which allows the designer
to document security-relevant information as part of UML
design models and is therefore suited to document and trans-
port security design experience.
By reusing these experiences and maybe existing eval-
uations of requirements, our elicitation tool HeRA assists
its users in specifying and analysing requirements with se-
curity implications. This infrastructure for applying experi-
ences further drives the organisational and individual learn-
ing processes: As HeRA benefits from reused experiences, it
becomes more effective, fewer problems get passed on, and
individuals learn more as they interact with HeRA. Experts
do not need to be involved all the time. They gain valuable
time for other important security tasks.
It is characteristic of our approach that the documenta-
tion of an improved process does not deprive individuals of
their important expert role – instead, it helps them to develop
their individual experience further.
All three aspects of organisational learning also con-
tribute to individual learning and qualification, when col-
lected and reused experience is fed back into the discussions
amongst the stakeholders.
Figure 1 shows our learning model. Learning takes place
during the activity ”Security Requirements Elicitation”. We
differentiate between organisational learning and its individ-
ual learning aspect.
1. Individual learning: Any participating individual can
apply his or her specific experiences. Through reflection, in-
dividuals learn while acting, which is a very effective way of
learning. This mode of learning is supported by constructive
breakdowns that allow individuals reflect in action whether
improvements are possible [42].
2. Organisational learning: Tools like HeRA can lever-
age an experience base. They analyse the security require-
ments created in the activity and compare them to experi-
ences encoded as heuristic critiques. If a critique fires, ex-
periences from the organisation get reused - the experience-
based tool shows a message, thus provoking a constructive
breakdown. This breakdown triggers reflection (see individ-
ual learning above). If a critique from the tools is incorrect,
individuals may choose to change the heuristic rules that au-
tomatically detect the critiques applicability (called encod-
ing in Figure 1). By this, the experience is added to the ex-
perience base.
In our case, it is important to introduce experience and
expertise from experts that are not participating in the elic-
itation task. Thus, we add two more experience flows from
the security expert to the individual (training) and to the ex-
perience base (encoding of experience as heuristic
rules). Encoding experiences or teaching individuals is still
a time-consuming task for the expert, but it will lead to im-
proved security requirements in the long term. Neverthe-
less, we try to uncover other sources of experience that are
cheaper. One of these sources is discussed in depth in this
paper: with the help of Bayesian classifiers we train HeRA
to automatically identify security relevant requirements. The
classifier is trained with requirements classified by the secu-
rity expert in older versions of the requirements document.
In the following sections, we present the main parts of
our approach: Modeling the flow of requirements and expe-
rience as the backbone for workflow infrastructure (Section
3). Novel activities are designed into that workflow; they
require support by heuristic assistant tools. We present the
HeRA tool and its newest extension, Bayesian classifiers
(Section 4). Those tools are characteristic of our approach
and represent concepts that can be directly reused in other
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5environments. Evolving workflows, on the other hand, con-
tain both general and environment-specific elements. A new
environment will need to update those models accordingly.
3 Improving the Flow of Requirements and Experience
In this section we describe step by step how we improved
the situation at ETSI by modeling, analyzing and improv-
ing the information [46]. We used the FLOW notation [39]
for modeling the sequence of situations and improvements.
FLOW was created as an information flow modeling lan-
guage which covers experience and both documented and
un-documented (fluid) information, e.g. requirements [37,
44]. It contains only a few simple symbols and arrows, as it
is supposed to be used for discussions [32]. All elements will
be introduced below as we need them to design improved
flows. In [38], we compared the FLOW notation to a num-
ber of related modeling notations, such as data flow [10],
process modelling [50], workflow [36], or UML. Those and
other notations may be used within our approach. The steps
presented below illustrate that it was feasible and useful to
use FLOW for that purpose.
3.1 Initial Situation at ETSI
Raw requirements from different sources flow into a given
software project. Their quality is rather poor: requirements
are inconsistent, ambiguous, and contain not enough detail
for security considerations. The process is not yet structured
in any way and depends on the few security experts avail-
able. This situation is sketched in Figure 2.
?!
Improved
Security 
Requirements
Raw
Requirements
Fig. 2 Initial Situation: Many raw requirements are transformed man-
ually into an improved security requirements specification. We only
know that Somehow, this is done by security experts.
Model: The document symbols represent documented
requirements or specifications. Three symbols together rep-
resent several documents of the same type. Raw require-
ments are transformed into improved security requirements
during an activity. The activity is modeled by a rectangle.
Since we know nothing about it yet, it is labeled with a ques-
tion mark instead of an activity name. Arrows denote the
flow of requirements.
Analysis: The unstructured activity does not provide any
support or guidance. Only competent security personnel is
able to carry out the transformation. The initial situation de-
pends entirely on their capability - and on their availability.
As we discussed in the introduction, they are often not avail-
able. This situation leads to the above-mentioned security
problems.
3.2 First Improvement: Guidance by Common Criteria
For improving this situation, ETSI is using guidance by
Common Criteria [15]. Common Criteria is a collection of
publicly available security domain experiences and guide-
lines as the standard is for free. However, the language used
in the standard require security expertise to understand and
make use of. This is what ETSI has provided guidelines for
and which we encode as experience in our approach. The
flow of requirements is improved by structuring the activ-
ity of transforming raw requirements into improved secu-
rity requirements. That transformation is broken into a se-
ries of refinement steps, as shown in Figure 3. This process
guides the stakeholders to first think about security needs
on an abstract level, such as the need of identification of
users to an application. It then guides the stakeholder to re-
fine these abstract statements into SMART security require-
ments through a number of steps, as shown in Figure 3. The
refinement can be looked upon as a number of questions
arising from the structure of ISO 15408 helping the stake-
holder both in the refinement and in the specification of the
security requirement.
Step 1
Raw
Requirements
Step 2 Step n
Improved
Security
Requirements
Common 
Criteria
…
Fig. 3 Situation 2: Common Criteria guides the refinement of raw re-
quirements into improved security requirements. A sequence of refine-
ment steps provides experience from the Common Criteria for each
step (gray arrows).
Model: In addition to the flow of requirements (black
arrows), the availability of experience on security require-
ments elicitation is crucial for the successful execution of
the refinement tasks. The gray arrows from Common Cri-
teria represent that flow of experience. Experience controls
how the activity is being carried out. For example, the exact
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6way of refining a requirement is being controlled by experi-
ence. The requirement itself is considered the input this ac-
tivity works on. In the model, input flow (e.g., requirements)
is attached to the activity rectangle from the side. Experi-
ence is attached to the top of the rectangle, which indicates
that it is not considered input, but control. At his point, only
experience documented in Common Criteria has been con-
sidered.
Analysis: This structure provides guidance, but cannot
compensate for missing expertise and experience. The Com-
mon Criteria document provides a static structure. It does
not dynamically adapt to new findings or known problems at
ETSI. Defining refinement steps offers a break-down struc-
ture for requirement analysis. The wording of Common Cri-
teria is directed towards security personnel. It is difficult
to understand and apply in practice. This situation consti-
tutes a formal guidance rather than content-oriented support.
Hence, the lack of security experts remains a problem.
3.3 Insight: Considering People
Since security experts are the main bearers of experience,
this fact should be modeled and optimised explicitly (Fig-
ure 4). Many other project participants lack awareness of se-
curity and the importance of identifying respective require-
ments early. Therefore, we explicitly include people into the
model.
Stakeholders
Improved
Security
Requirements
Raw
Requiremens
Security Expert
Fig. 4 Stakeholders write a document with initial raw requirements
each
Model: Requirements documents are written indepen-
dently. There are several stakeholders (e.g. representatives
of customers or partners) and their documents, depicted by
three overlayed symbols. All stakeholders are on their own.
The flow or requirements from those stakeholders to their
respective documents has particular properties: It can hardly
be repeated literally, since people forget what they wrote.
The flow can be disrupted easily as they are disturbed dur-
ing writing. In a metaphoric expression we call this fluid
information. It is quick and easy to transfer but it may be
spilled and lost. This is an important difference to so-called
solid information contained in a document.
Analysis: We consider it essential to model documented
(solid) and non-documented (fluid) information in our ap-
proach. Both types exist side by side and need to be taken
seriously. The intention of our models is to create a balanced
and appropriate network of forward and backward flows,
both solid and fluid. So far, the new model represents an
insight rather than an improvement. Resulting specifications
still need to be integrated by an expert. This situation also
does not accommodate learning. Stakeholders tend to repeat
their same problems over and over again, since they receive
no feedback on their specifications. However, this insight
stimulated searching for alternative flows during elicitation.
3.4 Improvement: Encouraging Direct Communication in
Workshop
Isolated stakeholders could not help each other, or benefit
by learning. Inspired by organisational learning aspect 3 (in-
frastructure), we considered interactive workshops for elic-
itation. When stakeholders write their requirements in such
a workshop (see Figure 5), they need less preparatory effort,
and they interact heavily. However, an experienced person
will be needed to summarize the discussion and write re-
quirements. A requirements engineer might be appropriate
for that task.
Stakeholders
Raw
Requirements
Requirements
Engineer
Fig. 5 Requirements are specified in a workshop.
Model: There are no new FLOW symbols in this model.
The extensive use of dashed lines indicates the fluid nature
of direct communication in a workshop. Depicting stake-
holders separately allowed us to highlight the communica-
tion between them – which did not occur with isolated stake-
holders.
Analysis: Talking is often considered faster and more
convenient. When one stakeholder raises requirements, oth-
ers may react to them or even identify security risks. An
experienced requirements engineer who is not a security ex-
pert, however, will be mainly concerned with requirements
elicitation and capturing.
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73.5 Improvement: Elicitation Pattern with Tool
An important improvement was the introduction of tool as-
sistance. HeRA is the Heuristic Requirements Assistant tool.
It uses heuristic rules for scanning requirements and issues
warnings when it detects potential problems. We applied this
principle on a wide range of heuristics [26]. In the context
of the security identification task, HeRA was equipped with
heuristics to identify security-relevant requirements.
We designed an elicitation pattern as it occurs in require-
ments engineering: HeRA helps by partially replacing secu-
rity experts. If at all, the expert provides guidance during the
writing of requirements. The expert may be substituted by a
stakeholder typing or copying into HeRA. Figure 6 depicts
this scenario.
Security
Requirements
Elicitation
Stakeholders
Security
Instructor
HeRA Tool
Discussed
Reqs.
Security
Expert
Fig. 6 Requirements Elicitation supported by a tool, with typical
flows.
Model: The distribution of fluid vs. solid arrows char-
acterizes the type of communication that determines this
workflow. In this case, it is a careful mix of documented
(solid) and fluid flows. Security instructors provide basic se-
curity knowledge and awareness. Their gray arrow stands
for the experience they transfer to stakeholders. Along the
same lines, the security expert mostly helps by controlling
the elicitation activity. Again, this is experience (gray) in se-
curity handling, not content knowledge of specific require-
ments (black). HeRA is depicted as a solid part. It is con-
nected to the activity rectangle from below. Like in SADT,
this indicates that HeRA supports the activity.
Analysis: HeRA checks stakeholder requirements by its
heuristic rules. Whenever it issues a warning, the potential
problem is discussed and the expert can facilitate that dis-
cussion. If there is no warning, requirements from a stake-
holder are accepted faster. This first check speeds up secu-
rity consideration and helps to save expert time. The pattern
consists of flows of experience from security-aware person-
nel. Both the instructor and the expert are not domain ex-
perts and should focus on security aspects. This pattern al-
lows them to do that. The HeRA tools acts as an interactive
editor for requirements; it also produces the solid output: a
set of requirements that have been checked for security im-
plications. From the perspective of organisational learning,
HeRA rules represent encoded experience. The focused dis-
cussions following a warning reach two goals at a time: a
specific security issue in a project is resolved; and all partic-
ipating stakeholders receive an intense lesson in security as
a side-effect. This addresses the challenges of organisational
and individual learning: avoiding additional effort. Note that
many of the flows in this pattern are fast and fluid but solid
HeRA stimulates them.
3.6 Improvement: Experience Reuse from Previous
Projects
Organisational learning calls for an infrastructure for ex-
change. The above models show local patterns of flow. The
elicitation pattern is the result of careful consideration on
the level of requirements and experience flows. The use of
HeRA represents the application of collected security ex-
perience in the form of heuristic rules. To get beyond the
local improvements, we sketched and designed an infras-
tructure of flows that would combine several of the above
models – and reach out for reuse of requirements from pre-
vious projects 7.
Model: Figure 7 describes the complete process and
flow of security requirements elicitation. Although this Fig-
ure is rather complex, it contains no new FLOW elements.
Analysis: There are three parts of this model: The elic-
itation pattern on the right side feeds into the activity in the
center. That activity refers to the above-mentioned five-step
refinement strategy at ETSI (see [23]). It receives the elicited
and discussed requirements with marks for potential security
problems. It is controlled by solid security experience that
was derived from Common Criteria and other sources (gray,
from top). There is also a reuse loop of specific experiences
and insights. It represents the case when a participating in-
dividual feeds back observations made in a project. On the
right side, there is the system construction part. It relies on
the UMLsec tool. In this phase, design decisions must be
taken. This is the point at which designers must consider se-
curity. They may gain new insights in the requirements that
caused security considerations in design. This is the time to
encode this insight into HeRA rules – for the benefit of all
future projects. They will be warned as early as during the
elicitation activity.
3.7 Latest Improvement: Solid Feedback
The feedback from UMLsec to HeRA rules in Figure 7 is
fluid: Some expert or participant of UMLsec system con-
struction is required to take time to encode the insight into
a heuristic rule. Organisational learning challenges remind
us that this requires altruism and might not always happen
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Construct
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Discussed
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Fig. 7 The overarching flow infrastructure of our so-called SecReq model: HeRA supports the security requirements elicitation by offering rule-
based critique. Downstream activities from construction feed back to inform security requirements elicitation.
under time pressure. We, therefore, envisioned a solid feed-
back flow that would cause no or very limited overhead.
In terms of the FLOW model, we wanted to add a solid
flow from the end of the central refinement activity to elic-
itation. After the five-step refinement process, several secu-
rity implications have been found. The key is to make those
insights available to future projects – and at a much earlier
point in time: during elicitation. Although the change in the
model is simple, its implementation is not. Improving the
flow infrastructure requires new tools to support it. In this
case, we found Bayesian classifiers as a concept for extend-
ing HeRA. While the overall model remains almost the same
(see Figure 7), a closer look needed to be taken at the elici-
tation activity, as shown in Figure 8
Model: Some elements have labels attached. They rep-
resent comments and are supposed to clarify the interfaces
between this refined Figure and the overall model (see Fig-
ure 9 in Section 4).
Analysis: Bayesian classifiers are explained in Section
4. At this point, flow modeling is useless without imple-
menting the tool features to support it. This model high-
lights that Security Requirements Elicitation will now be
controlled by Bayesian classifiers in addition to the other
heuristic rules used in HeRA. Bayesian classifiers need train-
ing sets before they can evaluate a new requirements docu-
ment for security relevance. Our vision was to use require-
ments that had gone through the five-step refinement process
for training.
Both feedback loops enhance organisational learning:
Stakeholders
HeRA Tool
Security Requirements 
Elicitation
Interactive Requirements 
Writing & Editing
Applying other
HeRA heuristics
Bayesian
classification
Improved
security
Reqs.
Discussed 
& marked
Reqs.
From:
Construct 
System
Used in: training set
From: Previous
projects & versions
Fig. 8 Details of the activity Security Requirements Elicitation in Fig-
ure 7. Bayesian classifiers are envisioned to reuse feedback from re-
quirements of previous projects
1. Explicit knowledge from designing secure systems is en-
coded in HeRAs heuristics.
2. Classification knowledge automatically captured by
HeRA’s Bayesian classifier.
From an organisational learning perspective, infrastruc-
ture and tool support are enhanced in an integrated way.
Individual stakeholders benefit from all kinds of feedback:
they all contribute to HeRA’s ability for security warnings.
As pointed out above, those warnings trigger discussions
that help stakeholders to learn. Tools like HeRA and doc-
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9uments like the improved requirements from the refinement
process represent collections of experience. Models and
their implementation provide infrastructure for exchange.
The three components of organisational learning have been
applied to security requirements engineering.
4 Heuristic Assistant Tools for the Experience Reuse
Our SecReq approach assists in security requirements elic-
itation. It provides mechanisms to trace security require-
ments from high-level security statements, such as security
goals and objectives, to secure design [14]. We aim at mak-
ing security best practices and experiences available to de-
velopers and designers with no or limited experience with
security. SecReq integrates three distinctive techniques (see
Figure 9): (1) Common Criteria and its underlying security
requirements elicitation and refinement process [15], (2) the
HeRA tool with its security-related heuristic rules [26], and
(3) the UMLsec approach for security analysis and design
[18].
During Section 3 the model in Figure 9 was developed
step by step. In this Section the working of Bayesian classi-
fiers in the HeRA tool will be introduced in order to imple-
ment that vision.
4.1 The HeRA Requirements Assistant
As pointed out, there are not many security experts, and
most security guidelines or ”best practices” are written by
and for security experts. Also, security best practices such
as standards ISO 14508 (Common Criteria), ISO 17799 are
static documents that do not account for new and emerg-
ing security threats. Security issues can be characterized as
known or hidden, generic or domain-specific. Normally, a
security expert is absolutely necessary to identify hidden se-
curity issues, while known issues can be identified using se-
curity best practices.
SecReq - and the HeRA tool in particular - guide the
translation of these best practices into heuristic rules. They
try to make better use of the few security experts around.
Rather than having experts do the identification and refine-
ment of all security issues, SecReq reuses their expertise and
makes their security knowledge available to non-security ex-
perts.
The basic idea behind HeRA is the use of heuristic tools
to analyse natural language requirements documentation and
to offer useful feedback [26,22]. Feedback is either con-
structive critique or a derived model. Both types of feedback
proved to be valuable to increase quality and productivity
when documenting requirements.
Derived models. Heuristic tools are able to automati-
cally derive models from textual use case descriptions [26].
UML use case diagrams give immediate feedback about the
context of the textual use case that is currently edited. Graph-
ical process models show how a set of use cases interacts to
support a global business process [24]. Automatically de-
rived use case point models help to identify problems like
requirements creep, i.e. unperceived growth of demanded
functionality over time [26].
Automatically derived models offer analysts additional
information that helps to make good decisions when doc-
umenting requirements. In addition, this kind of feedback
allows analysts to regard their requirements from a different
point of view. Evaluation showed that this helps to assess
the consistency and completeness of a given requirements
document.
Heuristic critiques. Heuristic critiques consist of a
heuristic rule, a meaningful message, and a criticality. The
heuristic rule can be used to analyse natural language re-
quirements and to identify situations where the critique is
appropriate. In this case the meaningful message is displayed
as a warning, an error, or a hint, depending on its criticality.
Heuristic critiques can be seen as an experience package
with a strong focus on reuse [27]. Evaluation showed that
users write better requirements documents with this kind
of experience support [25]. Evaluation showed that typical
users are able to adjust existing rules or to create new heuris-
tic critiques [22].
4.2 A Bayesian Filter Extension for HeRA
In this paper we describe an improved version of HeRA.
We intended to reduce the amount of manual work by mak-
ing better use of documents and experience from previous
projects. Figure 9 shows this improvement as a solid arrow
from improved security requirements from previous projects
back to the early security requirements elicitation activity
(shaded box). We use them to continually train a Bayesian
filter. Growing numbers of pre-classified requirements from
previous projects will increase the classification ability of
that filter. This new experience flow improves the effective-
ness and efficiency of the SecReq approach, because it re-
duces manual work by leveraging Bayesian classifiers. This
enables HeRA to address both generic and domain-specific
security aspects and to capture experts’ tacit knowledge bet-
ter. Based on this knowledge, heuristic computer-based
feedback can simulate the presence of a security expert dur-
ing security requirements elicitation.
4.2.1 Classifying Security Requirements.
For training the Bayesian classifier, we need pre-classified
requirements. During expert classification, we encountered
three different types of security requirements. We define:
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Fig. 9 Overview of SecReq approach with solid feedback from UMLsec to HeRA. In this model, Security Requirements Elicitation is supported
by applying Bayesian classifiers. They are trained by reusing documents from earlier projects. Specifications from previous projects are used to
train the classifiers. This establishes a solid feedback.
Security requirement:
(i) A (quality) requirement describing that a part of
the system shall be secure, or
(ii) a property which, if violated, may threaten the
security of a system.
In our context, security requirements are the result of
refining security-relevant aspects. Our goal is to support this
process.
Security-relevant requirement:
(i) A requirement that should be refined into one or
more security requirement(s), or
(ii) a property that is potentially important for assess-
ing the security of the system.
Example: “The card must ensure that the transaction
is performed by the same POS device as was used
for the purchase being canceled [. . . ]”
During pre-classification, we encountered another type
of requirements:
Security-related requirement:
(i) A requirement that gives (functional) details of
security requirements, or
(ii) a requirement which arises in the context of se-
curity considerations.
Example: “The card and the PSAM must use a public
key algorithm for mutual authentication and session
key exchange [. . . ]”
To support the identification of hidden security aspects,
we need to identify security-relevant requirements. It took
our experts some training to avoid false classification (e.g.
classifying a security or security-related requirement as be-
ing security-relevant). Furthermore, each and every func-
tional requirement could be regarded to be somewhat
security-relevant: Safety and Confidentiality of data should
always be ensured. Hence, we need a good classification
strategy for manual classification. The classification ques-
tion was very instrumental when classifying a requirement:
Classification Question:
Are you willing to spend money to ensure that the
system is secure with respect to this requirement?
Assume there is only a limited budget for refining
requirements to security requirements and that there
is a need to prioritize and balance cost and risk.
Outputs from security risk analysis approaches (such as
CORAS [11], CRAMM [4], and OCTAVE [1]) can be used
to support such evaluations, as these provide lists of threats,
their related risk level, and potential consequences. Some
approaches also directly consider potential monetary losses.
The question then becomes:
Can you afford to not invest to reduce or remove rel-
evant risks?
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5 Evaluation
Our approach of applying organisational learning to require-
ments engineering in secure system development has two
parts: modeling and design of flows, and the implementation
of dedicated tools to support those flows. Section 3 was de-
voted to a detailed step-by-step presentation of an evolving
flow model. We used the FLOW notation [38] which was de-
signed for modeling flows of requirements and experiences.
However, other notations might also be used for that pur-
pose. The sequence of models [38], analyses [46], and con-
clusions [44] demonstrates the reflective process involved
with improving infrastructures [45]. Solid versus fluid in-
formation and the distinction between requirements and ex-
perience flows were among the key concepts of modeling.
That discussion was intended not only to motivate the
final result of Figure 9. It also provided one case to demon-
strate the feasibility of modeling variants and improvements
with a simple notation. Other environments than ETSI will
need to consider their particular stakeholders, conventions,
and prescribed flows when they apply our approach.
In the remainder of this Section, the latest extension, Ba-
yesian Classifiers will be evaluated in depth.
5.1 Evaluation of Bayesian Classifiers
This section discusses the quality of classifiers and how they
can be used to assist in security requirements elicitation.
First, we define our evaluation goals in Section 5.1.1. Then
we describe our strategy to reach these goals and the general
process of evaluation in Section 5.1.2. Finally, we show and
discuss the results for each evaluation goal in Sections 5.1.3,
5.1.4, and 5.1.5.
5.1.1 Evaluation Goals
In order to evaluate our Bayesian classifiers, we define three
evaluation goals:
(G1) Evaluate accuracy of classifiers for security-relevant
requirements.
(G2) Evaluate if trained filters can be transferred to other
domains.
(G3) Evaluate how useful practitioners consider automati-
cally identifying security requirements.
For the goals (G1) and (G2) we used expert evaluation
to create meaningful test data, as described in Section 4.2.1.
In addition, we derived data from analysing existing require-
ments databases. Subsets of this test data were used to train
and evaluate the Bayesian classifiers. Our evaluation strat-
egy had to ensure that training and evaluation sets were kept
disjoint. In the context of this paper, goal (G3) is informally
evaluated by asking experts for their opinions about classi-
fication results. See Section 6.3 for the implications of our
results on industrial practice. A more formal evaluation re-
mains future work.
5.1.2 Evaluation Strategy
Assessing the quality of machine learning algorithms is not
trivial:
– Use disjoint training and evaluation data. We must not
use the same requirements for training and evaluation.
– Select training data systematically. For reproducible and
representative results, we need to systematically choose
the requirements we use for training.
– Avoid overfitting. We need to show that our approach is
not limited to the specific test data used. Overfitting hap-
pens when the Bayesian classifier adjusts to the specific
training data.
Typically, k-fold cross validation is used to deal with
these concerns [7,16]. This validation method ensures that
statistics are not biased for a small set of data [48]. The
dataset is randomly sorted and then split into k parts of equal
size. k − 1 of the parts are concatenated and used for train-
ing. The trained classifier is then run on the remaining part
for evaluation. This procedure is carried out iteratively with
a different part being held back for classification each time.
The classification performances averaged over all k parts
characterizes the classifier. According to [7], we used k =
10: With larger k, the parts would be too small and might
not even contain a single security-relevant requirement.
We used standard metrics from information retrieval to
measure the performance of Bayesian classifiers: precision,
recall, and f-measure [3]. Based on the data reported in [16],
we consider f-measures over 0.7 to be good. For our pur-
pose, high recall is considered more important than high
precision. A classifier is regarded useful in our SecReq ap-
proach if precision is at least 0.6, and recall is at least 0.7.
In our evaluation, we used three industrial requirements
documents:
– The Common Electronic Purse Specification (ePurse) [6]
– The Customer Premises Network specification (CPN)
[47]
– The Global Platform Specification (GP) [13]
As described in detail below, we experimented with various
different training sets applied to each of the three real-world
specifications.
Table 2 provides an overview of the three specifications
we used for evaluation of our classifiers: For each specifica-
tion (left column), we list the total number of requirements
they contain (2nd. column) and the number of requirements
considered security-relevant (3rd. column). We used either
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Table 2 Industrial requirements specifications used for evaluation.
Document total reqs. security-relevant reqs. security-relevance determined by
Common Electronic Purse (ePurse) 124 83 expert
Customer Premises Network (CPN) 210 41 database
Global Platform Spec. (GP) 176 63 expert
experts (see Sect. 4.2.1) or existing databases for identify-
ing security-relevant requirements (last column).
5.1.3 Accuracy of Security Classifiers: G1
To test the accuracy of the Bayesian classifier, we use 10-
fold cross validation on each of our classified specifications.
In Figure 10 we also show the results for smaller training
sets. Training size gives the number of parts in the 10-fold
cross validation considered for training. The trend shown in
Figure 10 helps to evaluate whether the training set is suf-
ficient. Results exceed the above-mentioned thresholds for
recall and precision. Hence, we consider the classifier use-
ful.
5.1.4 Transferability of Classifiers Trained in a Single
Domain: G2.a
Classifying industrial specifications manually was time-con-
suming. It was needed for training the classifiers. Reuse of
trained classifiers could reduce that effort. Therefore, we
evaluated the quality of classification when we applied a
trained classifier to specifications from different projects -
without additional training. In order to produce comparative
results, we used 10-fold cross validation in all cases, but var-
ied the specifications used for training and for applying the
classifiers.
Table 3 shows our results. The first column indicates
which specification was used for training. We list the qual-
ity criteria (recall, precision, and f-measure) when apply-
ing the respective classifier to each of the three industrial
specifications in the last three columns. Values on the main
diagonal are set in italics: they represent the special case
of (G1) reported above, where the same specification was
used for training and for testing. Even in those cases, the
10-fold cross validation ensured that we never used the same
requirements for training and evaluation.
The results in Table 3 are surprisingly clear: f-measures
on the diagonal are 0.86 and higher (same specification for
training and test). All other f-measures are far below 0.7:
whenever we used different specifications for training and
evaluation, transferability is very limited. A filter cannot eas-
ily be used in a different context.
Table 3 Training classifier with one specification, applying it to an-
other.
Training Applying to: ePurse CPN GP
ePurse recall 0.93 0.54 0.85
precis 0.83 0.23 0.43
f-measure 0.88 0.33 0.57
CPN recall 0.33 0.95 0.19
precis 0.99 0.98 0.29
f-measure 0.47 0.96 0.23
GP recall 0.48 0.65 0.92
precis 0.72 0.29 0.81
f-measure 0.58 0.4 0.86
5.1.5 Transferability of Classifiers Trained in Multiple
Domains: G2.b
If we apply a Bayesian classifier trained with a specification
from one domain to a different domain, we get poor results
(see G2.a). This could either point to the fact that we cannot
transfer classifiers to other domains or that we used a bad
training set. To investigate this, we carried out a third eval-
uation run where the classifier was trained with values from
a mix of specifications. For this, we join the requirements
from two or three specifications as input for the 10-fold cross
validation. The results in Table 4 show: When we used more
than one specification for training, the filter became more
generally applicable. If we used two specifications in train-
ing, the evaluation for the third specification delivered better
results than after a single-specification training (G2.a).
Combination of different specifications in training made
the classifier more generally applicable. Obviously, classifi-
cation quality is not only based on domain-specific terms -
which would not occur in the second training specification.
Thus, a good domain-independent classifier can be created
with a sufficiently large training set.
The bottom entry in Table 4 shows the results when we
combined all three specifications for training. Now we got
good results for all three specifications included in the eval-
uation. Figure 11 shows the learning curve, by giving the re-
sults when using less than 9 parts for training. The learning
curve grows not as fast as in the Figure 10, probably because
the classifier cannot leverage the domain specific concepts.
Nevertheless, we get a recall of 91 %, a precision of 79 %,
and a f-measure of 84 % - results that clearly show that the
trained classifier is suitable to support security requirements
elicitation in all of the three domains used for training.
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Fig. 10 Results of 10-fold cross validation using only one specification. Baseline is the precision we get when classifying all req. to be security-
relevant.
Table 4 Training with more than one specification.
Training Applied to: cross-eval ePurse CPN GP
ePurse + CPN recall 0.93 0.95 0.85 0.56
precis 0.81 0.80 1 0.51
f-m. 0.87 0.87 0.92 0.53
ePurse + GP recall 0.96 0.98 0.85 0.85
precis 0.80 0.78 0.26 0.8
f-m. 0.87 0.87 0.40 0.82
CPN + GP recall 0.87 0.31 0.75 0.88
precis 0.82 0.84 0.88 0.81
f-m. 0.85 0.46 0.81 0.84
ePurse + CPN recall 0.91 0.95 0.85 0.88
+ GP precis 0.79 0.80 0.94 0.78
f-m. 0.84 0.87 0.89 0.83
0
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Fig. 11 10-fold cross validation, multiple training
6 Discussion and Implications on Industrial Practice
In Section 5 we evaluated if it is possible to identify security-
relevant requirements with help of a Bayesian classifier. It is
important to note that for evaluation purposes we did not
use the Bayesian classifier in the way it was designed for
(compare Section 3):
– For evaluation we used a complete specification. Parts
of the specifications were used for training, other parts
were used for evaluation of recall and precision.
– In practice we suggest to use the Bayesian Classifier in
an Elicitation tool. Each requirement is classified imme-
diately after it has been written down.
This feedback can be used during an elicitation meeting
for immediate clarification on how to proceed with security-
relevant requirements. Later, it could be used to generate a
list of security-relevant requirements to discuss with secu-
rity experts. In our SecReq approach, we trigger a refine-
ment wizard that allows laymen to start with the refinement
themselves.
In this section we discuss whether the observed results
are sufficient for employing the filter in practice at its cur-
rent status. Then we take a look at the validity of our evalu-
ation of the Bayesian classifier filter. Finally, we summarise
the discussion with practitioners and describe how they per-
ceive the implications of the filter in practice, meaning their
development projects.
6.1 Interpretation of Evaluation Results
As shown in Section 5 we achieved very good results in
cases where the classifier is applied to the requirements from
the same source as it was trained with. We also observed
poor results in cases where the classifier was applied to a dif-
ferent requirements specification than the one it was trained
with. We also observed that the combination of training sets
from different sources produces a classifier that works well
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with requirements from all sources. This shows that a gen-
eral classifier for security relevance can be created by ap-
plying larger training sets and specifications from more do-
mains.
To summarise, in its current status the classifier is indeed
a very valuable addition for example in the context of soft-
ware evolution or product lines. I.e., the classifier could be
trained using the last version of the requirements specifica-
tion and than offer precious help in developing the new soft-
ware version. Typically, subsequent specifications resemble
their predecessor in large parts and add only small new parts.
Evaluation of this situation is covered by k-fold cross vali-
dation, as large (k − 1) parts of a specification are used for
training and applied to a small held-out part. Therefore, the
results in Figure 10 apply to this situation. In other situa-
tions, the learning curve in Figure 11 and tests with system-
atic training with falsely classified requirements show that
the classifier quickly adopts to new domains.
6.2 Discussion on Validity
Wohlin et al. define types of threats to validity for empiri-
cal studies [51]. We consider threats to construct, internal,
external, and conclusion validity to be relevant to our evalu-
ation.
Construct Validity. Construct validity deals with the
way the evaluation was set up and executed, i.e., the good-
ness of the evaluation process, the evaluation goals and the
distribution of evaluation variables (indirect and direct vari-
ables).
In our case, the assumptions made on the classification
question and our interpretation of what comprises a good re-
sult is critical to determining the goodness of the evaluation.
When it comes to the classification question there are many
alternative ways to define security-relevance. However, our
classification was an effective choice in practice as it helped
us to adjust our classification in a way that our security ex-
perts could agree on the majority of requirements. Next it is
important to consider whether it was sound to apply the clas-
sifier on final versions of requirements during the evaluation.
This depends on the level of abstraction on which the func-
tional information is presented. In practice the requirements
are regularly refined from high level functional requirements
to low-level descriptions of security-related aspects.
Internal Validity. Internal validity examines the confi-
dence in the accuracy of the results for the evaluation con-
text.
Concerning accuracy of the results, it is important to as-
sess the way that we handled training of the classifiers dur-
ing evaluation. We used k-fold cross validation and avoided
using identical requirements in training and evaluation, as
well as overfitting.
Randomly choosing requirements for training is not the
best way to produce a good filter. Ideally, we would train
the filter systematically with false positives and false nega-
tives, until it produces good results. Preliminary tests show
that this even increases the performance of the classifier with
very small training sets.
External Validity. External validity addresses the level
of generalisability of the results observed.
In our evaluation, we used three real-world requirement
specifications from different domains and authors. We have
no reason to doubt the applicability of our approach on dif-
ferent specifications.
Conclusion Validity. Conclusion validity addresses the
question, whether the results could be reproduced by others.
We used specifications from two different domains in
our evaluation. Therefore, we cannot guarantee that our re-
sults would hold for a third domain. To leverage this threat,
we invite others to replicate our experiment, or use our re-
sults and share our evaluation tool, classified data sets, and
the databases of learned words at:
http://www.se.uni-hannover.de/en/re/secreq.
6.3 Implications on Industrial Practice (G3)
In practice, there will rarely be budget to tackle all relevant
security aspects. Some of them may even conflict. Hence,
developers need to get the right security (i.e. the relevant and
adequate security requirements). For this reason, the classifi-
cation question (see Section 4.2.1) focuses on money, where
money covers both development costs but also the cost as-
sociated with the lack of a critical security feature in the
end-product (this includes costs, schedule, effort, resources,
etc.). When it comes to techniques and tools for security
elicitation support, such a tool needs to help a developer
getting security right (i.e. to implement the security require-
ments correctly), including being able to separate out the
important and prioritised security aspects and hidden secu-
rity requirements that are somehow concerned with potential
business and money consequences (loss and gain). Further-
more, such support must be integrated in a natural way such
that the tool supports the way the developer work in the se-
curity requirements elicitation process and not the other way
around. In practice, spending money on something that is
not going to end up in the final system is often considered a
waste of time and effort.
The Bayesian classification as an addition to SecReq not
only contributes to a more effective and focused security
elicitation process, but also in separating important from not
so important security-relevant aspects. The Bayesian clas-
sification and security expert simulation in HeRA directly
enables effective reuse of earlier experience, as well as pri-
oritising and company specific security-related focus areas
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or policies. In particular, HeRA provides the ability to train
the classification to be system and project specific. The abil-
ity to first train the classification engine to understand how
to separate important security-relevant aspects from not so
important, and then use this newly gained knowledge to tra-
verse functional descriptions and already specified security
requirements have a promising potential to contribute in a
better control of security spending in development projects.
6.4 Outlook: Training by simulation
Our experience shows that the individual learning aspect is
very important. The impact of participating in discussions
supported by heuristic tools on security issues is very strong.
We envision to use this effect for training. Figure 12 shows
this situation in FLOW. Based on a list of raw requirements,
security requirements are interactively written. HeRA analy-
ses these inputs based on the various feedback facilities. The
stakeholder learns during this simulated security elicitation
session by reflecting on the feedback.
Stakeholders
HeRA Tool
Security Requirements 
Elicitation Training
Interactive Requirements 
Writing & Editing
Applying other
HeRA heuristics
Bayesian
classification
Improved
security
Reqs.
From:
Construct 
System
From: Previous
projects & 
versions
Raw
reqs. forl
training
Fig. 12 A stakeholder trains security requirements elicitation.
Advantages:
– No expert needed for training, no instruction needed
– Up-to date experience can be used (same as for produc-
tive work)
– Stakeholders and new security people can use training
by simulation to get adjusted to the particularities of the
environment.
– Repetition of training is simple due to HeRA automa-
tion. Improvement can be seen when using the same in-
put.
– Smooth transition from training to learning, even inter-
twining phases of work with phases of individual learn-
ing in the simulator.
7 Related Work
The section focuses on several existing works that are re-
lated with our work. We first discuss the state of the art
of security requirement engineering process and tool sup-
port, then related work about information flow modeling and
heuristics and finally the works relating to natural language
processing in the requirement engineering domain.
7.1 Security Requirements
A significant amount of work has been carried out on secu-
rity requirements engineering, in particular relating to tool-
support for security requirement engineering. Chung con-
sidered a process-oriented approach to develop secure in-
formation system [8]. Security goals are considered as a
class of criteria for selecting among design decisions and as
a part of the overall process including decomposition, sat-
isficing and argumentation methods. A prototype develop-
ment tool is presented for the security requirements elicita-
tion. The tool includes a graphical interface to view the goal
graph expansion process and to interactively browse, select
and apply methods, and a textual interface to enter argu-
ments towards a design rationale. Mouratidis, Giorgini et al.
propose an argumentation based extension of the i*/Tropos
requirements engineering framework to deal with security
requirements [33,12]. The approach allows one to capture
high-level security requirements before analysing the spe-
cific solution design. Giorgini et al. further introduced the
ST-Tool for design and verification of functional and secu-
rity requirements based on the Secure Tropos methodology
[52]. The tool supports analysing goals, actors, services, and
data of corresponding objects through a GUI interface. The
models can be analyzed as to whether they satisfy some gen-
eral desirable security properties. SecTro is an automated
modelling tool that also provides support for the Secure Tro-
pos methodology for the development of secure information
systems [53]. The tool analyses the security goals, secu-
rity constraints, task, and resources through a security en-
hanced actor model. SecTro also allows one to analyse the
attackers goals and attacks through security attack scenario.
Ouedraogo et al. presents an agent-based system to support
assurance of security requirements [34]. Based on Secure
Tropos, the approach complement security requirements en-
gineering methodologies by gathering continuous evidence
to check whether security requirements have been correctly
implemented. Matulevicius et al. presents an approach which
adapts Secure Tropos for security risk management in the
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early phases of information systems development [30]. It al-
lows for checking Secure Tropos concepts and terminology
against those of current risk management standards. Sindre
and Opdahl propose an approach to eliciting security re-
quirements based on use cases, which extends traditional
use cases to also cover misuse [43]. Mellado et al. present
the SREPPLine tool which provides automated support for
the security requirement engineering process for software
product lines (SREPPLine) [31]. The tool mainly supports
the automation of security requirements management activ-
ities involved in SREPPLine. The tool prioritizes the secu-
rity requirements and generates a security requirement spec-
ification document. However, activities that introduce new
requirements (i.e. updates of the security feature repository)
are performed manually. The UMLsec tool [17] supports the
analysis of the security aspects expressed in the security ex-
tension UMLsec [18] of the Unified Modeling Language
(UML). The tool mainly focuses on the verification of the
most important security requirements, which can be directly
used in the model, together with their formal definitions.
In summary, most of the related work dealing with the
management of security requirements has the goal to anal-
yse and verify the requirements through goals, tasks, re-
sources, and design models within the system environment.
Furthermore, security expertise is required to operate these
tools. In contrast, our work focuses on an approach support-
ing organisational learning on security requirements by es-
tablishing company-wide experience resources, and a socio-
technical network to benefit from them. The approach is
based on modelling the flow of requirements and related ex-
periences. It can be used in conjunction with the security
requirements analysis approaches mentioned above.
7.2 Information Flow Modelling
Winkler uses information flow models to increase traceabil-
ity in software projects [49]. Damian et al. consider social
networks to describe communication in software projects by
differentiating media from transfer information, and identi-
fies patterns like ”bottleneck” [9]. Schneider et al. propose
a simple graphical notation for describing the flow (path)
of information such as requirements and security require-
ments are a special case of the information [38]. This work
distinguishes between so-called ”solid” (document-based)
and ”fluid” (e.g. spoken, email, informal) representations.
Dashed lines and faces denote flow and storage of fluid in-
formation, whereas solid lines and document symbols rep-
resent solid information representation. Unlike the work of
Winkler in [49], fluid information is modelled explicitly.
Dashed lines and faces denote flow and storage of fluid in-
formation, whereas solid lines and document symbols rep-
resent solid information representation. An interesting ob-
servations on this information flow modelling approach in a
financial institution is shown by Stapel et al. in [46]. In [2],
Allmann et al. and in [45], Stapel et al. further used it in the
automotive industry to describe and improve the relationship
between a car company (OEM) and its subcontractors.
Often, specific support tools can be built once an infor-
mation flow problem has been identified, as discussed in
[41]. The information flow and its presentation across solid
and fluid allow to stimulate heuristic approaches that can be
applied even before any given solid document exists.
7.3 Natural Language Processing in Requirements
Natural language is often used to support the specification of
requirements, if only as an intermediate solution before for-
mal modelling. As natural language is inherently ambiguous
[5], several approaches have been proposed to automatically
analyse natural language requirements to support require-
ments engineers for quality requirements specification doc-
uments [28,29,7,20]. Kof, Lee et al. work on extracting se-
mantics from natural language texts by focusing on the semi
automatic extraction of an ontology from a requirements
document [28,29]. Their focus is on identifying ambigui-
ties in requirements specifications. This ontology replaces
a glossary and allows all stakeholders to communicate in a
consistent way. This work may applicable for our context but
not straight, This work may applicable to our approach, al-
though not directly because i) Ontology Extraction remains
a work-intensive task which needs to be integrated into the
requirements engineering process, and ii) it does not support
analysis per requirement and iii) it does not support the iden-
tification and refinement of security-relevant requirements.
Kiyavitskaya et al. describe ambiguity identification in
natural language requirements specifications using tool sup-
port [21]. Their results partly apply to our approach, as both
undetected ambiguous and security relevant requirements
could cause severe problems during a project. However the
ambiguity metrics presented in this work cannot easily be
adopted to detect security requirements, but we agree that
such tools should ideally have 100 % recall, not too much
imprecision, and a high summarisation. This would allow
the user to work on a set of potential ambiguous or security
relevant requirements that is considerably smaller portion
of the requirements specification. However if the recall is
smaller, the user has to scan the whole specification for un-
detected requirements. As opposed to disambiguation, every
requirement is to some degree security relevant. Therefore,
in our context, the selection of some requirements is mainly
a question of costs associate with refining it to security re-
quirements.
Chantree et al. describe how to detect nocuous ambigu-
ities in natural language requirements (i.e. how to interpret
the conjunctions and/or in natural language) by using word
distribution in requirements to train heuristic classifiers [7].
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The process of creating the dataset is very similar to our
work: collection and classification of realistic samples based
on the judge of multiple experts to enhance the quality of the
dataset. However, the heuristics are partly based on statistics
from the British National Corpus (BNC). We did not find an
obvious way to use such statistics for detection of security-
relevant requirements. The reported results (recall = 0.587,
precision = 0.71) are useful in the described context, but are
too low for the SecReq approach.
8 Conclusion
In this paper, we addressed the problem that security be-
comes increasingly important in environments where there
may not be any security experts available to assist in require-
ments activities. This situation leads to the risk that require-
ments engineers may fail to identify, or otherwise neglect,
early indicators for security problems. We presented a tool-
supported method that provides assistance for the labour-
intensive and error-prone first round of identifying and an-
alysing security requirements. The approach supports organ-
isational learning on security requirements by establishing
company-wide experience resources, and a socio-technical
network to benefit from them. It is based on modelling the
flow of requirements and related experiences. With help of
these models, we enable people to exchange experiences
about security-requirements while they write and discuss
project requirements. At the same time, the approach en-
ables participating stakeholders to learn while they write re-
quirements. This can increase security awareness and facil-
itate learning on both individual and organisational levels.
As a basis for our approach, we introduce heuristic assistant
tools which support reuse of existing security-related expe-
riences. The tool support makes use of a trained Bayesian
classifier in order to heuristically categorise requirements
statements as security-relevant resp. less security-relevant.
We also showed how HeRA, our heuristic requirements as-
sistant tool can be used to integrate that filter mechanism
into a secure software development process. Note, that the
approach is not restricted to HeRA, and can be used in other
elicitation tools.
We evaluated this approach using several industrial re-
quirements documents; ePurse, CPN, and GP. Our experi-
ences with this ”real-life” validation was overall positive:
According to the numerical results, the approach succeeds
in assisting requirements engineers in their task of identify-
ing security-relevant requirements, in that it reliably identi-
fies the majority of the security-relevant requirements (re-
call > 0.9) with only few false positives (precision > 0.8)
in software evolution scenarios. Our evaluation of differ-
ent training strategies shows that the classifier can quickly
be adopted to a new domain when no previous versions of
requirements specifications are available for training. This
could be done by a security expert during a first interview.
As another benefit of applying the FLOW approach in
this context, it also the user to engage in ”meta-learning”,
meaning that the approach supports the creation of experi-
ence regarding the learning process itself, which in turn can
be used to improve the effectiveness of the learning process.
As an outcome, this improvement can lead to better levels
of security in practice through the intertwining learning of
individuals and the organisation.
Our approach does not aim at completeness in a strict
logical sense. There is no 100% guarantee that all security-
relevant requirements are found, nor that no non-security-
relevant requirements are falsely reported. This is, however,
a limitation that is directly imposed by the current limi-
tations from computational linguistics (essentially, the fact
that a true automated text understanding is currently not
available). In general, security experts cannot give such a
guarantee, either. Therefore, we believe that the approach
provides useful assistance in that it supports requirements
engineers to identify security-relevant requirements, when
no security expert is present. Even if security experts are
present, our approach helps them to focus on already iden-
tified requirements and thereby efficiently use their limited
time. Moreover, since this selection process is supported by
automated tools, its execution is easy to document and it is
repeatable and thus well auditable. This adds another level
of trustworthiness to the process, compared to an entirely
manual assessment.
Based on our work we see two main topics for future
research. On the one hand, it would be interesting, if the ap-
proach could be applied to other types of cross-cutting qual-
ity requirements (e.g. safety or usability). On the other hand,
the application in industrial practice will show the efficiency
of our approach.
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